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2Setting Signals for European Foreign and Security Policy –
Discussing Differentiation and Flexibility
European foreign and security policy might reach a decisive breakthrough. Whereas the
1990s were characterised by a rather hesitant search of the European Union (EU) to
define its role as a regional and international security actor, at the beginning of the
twenty-first century developments are underway which will have a lasting effect on
European and international politics in the final outcome. If the Union succeeds in
leading the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), a constitutive
part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), out of the planning stage
and putting it into practice, this will have an enduring impact on international politics.
Fundamental decisions concerning the further development of CESDP are deemed
necessary. However, it seems most likely that the European Council of Nice in
December 2000 will not decide upon any comprehensive changes in the EU Treaty.
Nevertheless, far reaching reflections on CFSP which transcend institutional and
procedural questions and, in particular, treat the importance of differentiation and
flexibility for the future capability of European foreign policy to take action and shape
policies seem urgent.
The logic of increasing cooperation in foreign and security policy from the early stages
of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s to the creation of CFSP at the
beginning of the 1990s creates a compulsion from within the system to take action,
since foreign and security policy constitutes a basic element of a future Political Union.
Due to the shift of power constellations in international politics after 1989/90 and the
new potentials for conflict in the vicinity of the (enlarged) EU, an external compulsion
to react adequately has arisen, and the Union must address this with suitable
institutional, procedural and operative measures. The EU’s limited possibilities in the
field of security policy and the need to broaden the Union’s range of influence
manifested themselves at the latest during the Kosovo conflict. In addition, the
transatlantic and NATO dimension needs to be clarified. The process of role definition
concerning the EU and the United States in international politics has not yet been
3resolved. On the contrary, the concept of transatlantic burden-sharing is looming over
the debate without yet having been precisely defined.
In reaction to this many-faceted predicament the EU can either choose the familiar
policy of small reform steps or it can follow a more differentiated path towards the
finalité of the integration process. As the issue of enlargement is becoming more and
more pressing and as the debate concerning the future of European integration is
intensifying, it seems important to link this strategic reform debate with the
development of CFSP/CESDP. The conventional understanding of the European
integration process has to be overcome for assuring the Union’s capability to act, for
raising the efficiency of the policy-making process and for promoting the acceptance of
European foreign policy amongst EU citizens. Already at this stage, it is no longer
adequate to govern the EU along the lines of the Rome Treaties and it will become even
more problematic in a Union enlarging to 25 and more member states.
At present, all the different scenarios on the future of the integration process attempt to
find new answers to the old twin challenge of enlargement and deepening. In every
single one of these scenarios a prominent role was attributed to the issue of
differentiated integration. According to the central argument common to all these ideas,
a smaller group of member states “staunchly committed to the European ideal” is in a
position to push ahead with political integration. Jacques Delors has called for an
avantgarde of the six founding EC member states; Helmut Schmidt and Giscard
d'Estaing have argued for a core Europe consisting of the Euro-11(12); Jacques Chirac
and Alain Juppé and Jacques Toubon support the creation of a pioneer group and
Joschka Fischer has called for a centre of gravity without specifying the number of
member states participating in such an inner group.
Differentiation and flexibility are one way out of the old dilemma of reconciling
widening and deepening of the Union. The main reason for a revision of the current
Treaty provisions concerning closer cooperation is based on the worries of the majority
of EU governments that the enlargement could block attempts to harmonise policies in
areas which have not yet been brought within the Union’s remit. The major question is:
Can the integration process be deepened further by adhering to the existing method of
integration, or must this method itself be reconsidered? In an attempt to answer this
4question, the fundamental lack of concrete proposals and concepts needs to be
overcome, especially regarding the institutional, procedural and legal implications of
closer cooperation in specific policy fields. The potential policy fields subject to closer
cooperation which are presently being discussed include justice and home affairs
(especially the fight against organised crime), environmental protection, the further
development of a European economic and financial policy and, especially, issues related
to foreign, security and defence policy (CFSP/CESDP). Furthermore, talking about
closer cooperation leads to the term flexibility. Closer cooperation and flexibility are
integral parts of differentiated integration. Quite often both terms are used in the debate
without clearly distinguishing between their different meanings. This discussion paper
attempts to explain how the difference between both terms can be understood and in
which way they can be applied. The thoughts that will be developed should be
understood as an attempt to sketch out the possibilities of differentiated integration in
the sphere of CFSP/CESDP and as such they shall trigger an open and critical debate.
5A New Pattern of Integration
In accordance with a policy of small steps, the member states would continue to adhere
to the familiar and trusted “Monnet Method” with its step-by-step communitarization,
with no blueprint for the final outcome – even under the conditions of an enlarged EU.
For the CFSP this would mean to focus on all the possibilities in the EU Treaty already
endorsed but not yet applied to their full extent, allowing for the current structures,
mechanisms and instruments to be altered and supplemented in compliance with the
Treaty. However, since the current Intergovernmental Conference (IGC 2000) will
probably offer no major changes for the CFSP in the sense of amending the respective
provisions of the Treaty, a comprehensive revision would thus necessitate the renewed
invocation of an IGC after the Nice European Council in December 2000.
The pressure on the EU for action and the heterogeneity of interests and possibilities
among member states can only be reconciled if it becomes possible for individual states
to bind themselves to one another more closely. To achieve this, the regulations
concerning closer cooperation need to be reformed as soon as possible. In revising the
current provisions, certain basic requirements must be taken into account: (i)
preservation of a uniform institutional framework; (ii) compatibility with the overall
goals of the European Union; (iii) respect of the legal regulations already agreed upon.
Closer cooperation should only be put to use when cooperation of all EU member states
seems impossible. In particular, closer cooperation should be designed in an open
manner, allowing current as well as future member states the option to join at a later
date on the basis of a pre-determined procedure in which the Commission has to be
assigned an important role.
Any amendment of the current provisions should explicitly introduce closer cooperation
for issues concerning the field of CFSP. Closer cooperation, however, is neither to be
understood as a general remedy nor as the final outcome of the integration process.
Moreover, the discussion about concrete scenarios of differentiation cannot substitute a
debate about further central reform issues, e.g. the future distribution of competencies,
the re-organisation of the Treaties or the building of a European constitution. Instead,
differentiated integration offers member states willing to act cooperatively the chance
6for a community oriented deepening of integration without operating outside the
Treaties, as experienced in the case of the Schengen agreement.
Closer cooperation can turn out to be the adequate way to bring further integration steps
and the enlargement of the Union into line. Trying to reform the CFSP fundamentally
by traditional means through another IGC after Nice, would mean either postponing
reform  for an unspecified period of time or delaying the enlargement again for years,
since the EU’s agenda is already tight and always on the verge of being overloaded. By
contrast, the instrument of closer cooperation offers those member states willing to
cooperate, whose number cannot and should not be determined as of now, the chance to
further communitarize certain fields of the CFSP within a confined setting at an earlier
date. This would not equal an end to integration in this field, but rather represent a sort
of learning phase for the future and a redefinition of integration. The experience gained
with EPC has demonstrated that certain measures were implemented for intensifying
political cooperation, which were given a legal basis only at a later stage. Closer
cooperation in the CFSP could produce a similar effect. In practice, cooperation of
willing member states could not only prove that cooperation concerning the non-
military aspects of foreign and security policy is possible within a communitarian
framework – able to meet the challenges of international politics – but also that it offers
an adequate approach under the circumstances of an enlarged EU. If closer cooperation
proves successful, hesitant member states might join at a later date.
But what does closer cooperation mean? It has been argued elsewhere that initially,
closer cooperation means nothing more than increased intergovernmentalization under
pressure from the facts and the shortcomings of the “Monnet Method.” But why must
closer cooperation be an intergovernmental exercise? Could it not constitute a new
method for integration rather than a method for – at least temporarily – increasing
intergovernmentalism. If differentiated integration is to be understood as a preliminary
stage towards a Political Union, communitarian elements or even strengthened
communitarian elements must find themselves in the respective field of cooperation –
thereby creating a “model of community oriented closer cooperation.”
At the present stage, community oriented closer cooperation should be limited to non-
military aspects. Taking into account the experience with cooperation in foreign policy
7during the past decades and the primate of intergovernmentalism concerning hard
security questions, its application in the military field of CFSP does not seem very
realistic for the time being. Military cooperation within the framework of CESDP, now
only in its beginning stage, should be handled very carefully. Long-term experience
with this kind of cooperation has not yet been gained, and the mutual trust required
between the states concerned still has to develop. Instead, the main focus of attention
must be on building sufficient capabilities and putting the decisions from the EU
summits of Cologne, Helsinki and Feira into action. The delicate and challenging task
of military security cooperation amongst EU member states should not be put at risk by
overly ambitious experiments of institutional or procedural nature. Rather, flexible
security cooperation should be the predominant motto.
But what does community oriented closer cooperation concerning the non-military
aspects of CFSP/CESDP mean in concrete terms? If differentiated integration is to be
understood as a preliminary stage towards a Political Union and as an overarching prin-
ciple, the non-military part of the CFSP has to incorporate communitarian or even
strengthened communitarian elements through closer cooperation. Correspondingly, this
will affect the role of the EU institutions and the adjustment of procedural processes.
Community Oriented Non-Military Closer Cooperation1
Commission
Developing a model of community oriented non-military closer cooperation has to
consider the European Commission as an actor of central importance, whose influences
has grown steadily in the course of the development of CFSP. While the Treaty of
Maastricht accorded the Commission a very restricted status compared to the Council,
the Treaty of Amsterdam already provided for improvement. Due to the results of the
European Council of Helsinki, the Commission has been further upgraded. While the
Council was assigned new committees to plan and coordinate military crisis
management of CFSP/CESDP (Political and Security Committee (PSC), Military
Committee), the Commission has pledged itself to non-military crisis management. This
                                               
1 See annex: “Differentiated Integration in the Field of CFSP/CESDP.”
8seems to be reasonable and in accordance with the logic of EU external relations. But if
the coherence of military and non-military measures should be ensured and the non-
military capabilities and capacities put comprehensively to use, the Commission must
be granted an even stronger role within the framework of a community oriented closer
cooperation. The competencies of the Commissioner responsible for external relations
would have to be increased accordingly and cooperation between his office and the
office of the High Representative for the CFSP would have to be linked more closely in
order to create synergetic effects and to counteract an emerging institutional
competition. This includes an intensified and regular process of coordination as well as
joint appearances of both representatives of EU foreign policy. The views presented by
9Chris Patten, the Commissioner in charge of external relations, confirm that the
Commission no longer views itself as an accomplice of the Council in CFSP but instead
is developing into an independent actor striving for further competencies in the
respective policy fields.
High Representative
In spite of the rising expectations voiced in regard to the High Representative for the
CFSP, the member states are still keeping his range of competencies limited. In search
of a face and voice for EU foreign policy, however, it will prove imperative that third
states can recognise a continuously present and active representative who is able to rely
on the support of the member states. In his function as Secretary General of both the
Council and the Western European Union (WEU), the High Representative occupies a
position of strategic importance in the process of formulating policy. By contrast, in an
enlarged EU rotating presidencies are not adequate for enhancing the profile of the
Union in foreign policy matters. In addition, this system of external representation is
completely unsatisfactory in respect to crisis management. It therefore seems urgent to
strengthen simultaneously both the High Representative as well as the Commission
within the framework of closer cooperation.
European Council / Council
Principles and overall guidelines for closer cooperation concerning the non-military
aspects of CFSP must be defined by the Heads of State and Government of the
participating EU countries. However, it also has to be taken into consideration that an
ineffective shift of the institutional balance in favour of the Heads of State and
Government has taken place within the triangle of Council, Commission and European
Council throughout the past years. Following the emergence of CFSP, the foreign
ministers have increasingly focused their attention on their own inherent field of
administration instead of fulfilling their co-ordinating role as originally intended. In
order for the General Council to regain its initial position within the institutional
structure, the manifold demands placed upon it need to be reduced. This could be
achieved without affecting the coherence of foreign and security policy by
strengthening the High Representative and the Commission as mentioned above.
European Parliament
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The question of legitimisation is of central importance for promoting acceptance of the
CFSP among EU citizens. In addition to the primary role accorded to the national par-
liaments it is therefore necessary to involve the European Parliament (EP) in all non-
military aspects, thus providing for double legitimisation. Its participation should be
guaranteed not only by the EP’s right of its view to be taken into consideration and its
right to be regularly informed (Art. 21, TEU), but it ultimately requires the EP’s parlia-
mentary assent. Within the framework of community oriented closer cooperation in the
non-military field of CFSP not only the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)
of the states participating in closer cooperation should be involved, but all MEPs – for
the EP, like the Commission, is to be understood as a supranational institution.
Procedural Process
Institutional changes entail adjustments in procedural processes. Within the framework
of closer cooperation in the non-military field of CFSP all EU states can participate in
the discussions, but only those who have joined closer cooperation should be allowed to
vote – thus creating a Council within the Council. In general, it is worth striving for
qualified majority voting, but during a limited phase of transition the Council within the
Council should continue to take decisions by consensus on the basis of proposals of the
Commission or on initiative of a member state and after having heard the European
Parliament. After an initial period, the Council within the Council could unanimously
pass a resolution (having heard the EP) according to which the principle of decision-
taking on the basis of qualified majority voting is to be applied to all fields of closer
cooperation concerning the non-military aspects of CFSP – decisions concerning
possible protective clauses would have to be decided upon at the appropriate time.
In an early phase the right of initiative of the participating member states would be
retained by the Council. However, it could also be bestowed upon the High Representa-
tive. In a next step, the Council within the Council would take decisions solely on the
basis of propositions by the Commission or the High Representative. Should the
member states’ right of initiative be abolished, the Commission or respectively the High
Representative would nevertheless be obliged to examine every proposal by a member
state. The requirement of unanimity and the member states’ co-right of initiative during
the first years of closer cooperation constitute a special protective device taking into
account the sensitivity of the policy field for EU member states.
11
Flexible Military Security Cooperation
Apart from this non-military dimension, what can be said about the development of the
military aspects of CFSP/CESDP and why does the term flexibility become relevant in
this context? The medium-term goal of the integration concept concerning CFSP should
consist in assigning only those tasks of the Union regarding military aspects to the
intergovernmental oriented second pillar of the Treaty, while all other fields should be
subject to communitarization. Commitment to the CESDP should not only result in EU
appropriation of WEU tasks, but the Western European Union itself should be dis-
solved. The corresponding WEU functions, tasks and instruments should be fully
assumed by the EU. Article V of the WEU Treaty should be included in the EU Treaty
as a solidarity article or attached to it as a protocol.
The NATO Dimension
At this point in time, it seems premature to speak of a defence union. Nevertheless, the
attainments as of now clearly indicate that, in terms of an extended definition of secu-
rity, the EU is developing into a security union. At present, however, defence questions
are still to be classified within the context of NATO. Regarding the organisation of
transatlantic relations, it will become necessary to develop binding patterns of inter-
action between the EU and NATO. Consultations and cooperation between both must
hereby fully respect the autonomy of EU decision-making processes. Instead of creating
a competitive situation between the Union and NATO, the deepening of military
cooperation between EU member states within the framework of the CESDP and the
transfer of WEU tasks to the EU would rather offer the possibility for clearly defined
cooperation. For this, the creation of adequate European capabilities is of crucial
importance. This includes an exact evaluation of the military capabilities and resources
of each of the member states and the exploitation of relevant synergies.
A Model of Regulated Flexibility2
                                               
2 See annex: “Differentiated Integration in the Field of CFSP/CESDP.”
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In the sensitive field of military affairs, to which states attribute the high value of
national sovereignty, it is especially important to avoid creating non-intentional
outcomes. This is why military issues must not be linked with the term
“communitarization.” Instead, matters of joint concern should be handled by means of
intergovernmentalism. It will be most important to avoid irritating Great Britain, whose
participation is of key importance for any effective and functional military cooperation,
by speaking of taking steps in the direction of “communitarization” in the field of
military security. And it is also important that no EU member state be excluded in the
present situation, for consent concerning a flexible CFSP, capable of applying military
measures, is dependant upon consensus or at least upon the abstaining states’
willingness to accept decisions made by those willing to take action.
Flexibility in the military part of CESDP does not require differentiation. Instead, it
comprises flexible procedures and ways of conduct which are based on existing
structures and, at the same time, extend these – creating a “model of regulated
flexibility.” Should a concrete crisis arise, it would be possible for a certain number of
willing and capable states to take military measures. The mechanisms of flexible
security cooperation should ensure that each EU state is given the opportunity to make
its own specific contribution. If procedures and ways of conduct do not follow a
regulated flexible approach, those states willing to take action will develop their own
initiatives outside the framework of the EU, thus eroding the Union’s credibility as a
coherent international security actor.
It seems probable that the group of EU countries willing to take action will consist of a
certain, constantly recurring constellation, analogous to the EU member states part of
the contact group – but not exclusively. Other states willing to take action, including
NATO states which are not members of the Union and EU accession states, would be
able to participate in variable constellations. The number of constructive proposals
made by the Portuguese and French Presidencies concerning this issue (e.g. the phase-
oriented model for the participation of non-EU member states) as well as the question of
EU and NATO cooperation (creation of EU-NATO working groups) lead in the right
direction. With regard to Russia, intensified cooperation between the EU and Moscow,





Differentiated integration will function as a catalyst for European integration in
manifold ways. The prospect that some countries will move further ahead might cause
sceptical EU members to rethink their position and help get their agreement to further
deepen integration after Nice. Differentiated integration put into practice by means of
closer cooperation, will not contribute to more transparency, on the contrary, it will
increase the already high degree of complexity of the EU’s institutional and procedural
system even more. However, for a result oriented approach further integration by means
of differentiation and flexibility is necessary. If it is understood as a means of paving
the way to a Political Union, it might prove essential for a continuation of the
integration process and at the same time hinder an uncontrolled spreading of ad-hoc
coalitions outside the Treaty framework.
The quality of closer cooperation will affect the path towards any form of finalité. For
this reason, it is important to go beyond the general ideas on differentiated integration
currently so much en vogue and elaborate on the details of closer cooperation in
particular policy fields. Should increased intergovernmentalism – even if applied only
for a limited period of time – prove to be the only way for closer cooperation, then this
will most probably affect the future of the EU as a whole, since communitarian
elements, especially concerning the future role of supranational institutions like the
Commission or the Parliament might end up on the political scrap heap. A community
oriented approach, on the other hand, offers member states willing to cooperate the
chance to further deepen integration, by strengthening communitarian institutional and
procedural elements.
Closer cooperation in the non-military part of CFSP has far-reaching consequences and
raises a lot of questions. The argument presented by the Portuguese Presidency, stating
that the need for closer cooperation in the field of CFSP is not as pressing as in other
fields of the EU, should be taken seriously. But if the European Union does not embrace
a new pattern of integration, the policy of small steps will be continued. In consequence,
combining the enlargement of the EU with the reform of CFSP could only be achieved
with great difficulty and delay. If the Union does not succeed in putting CFSP into the
core context of a differentiated integration concept, it will not fulfil expectations
15
regarding its role in international politics. Undertaking action concerning the non-
military aspects of CFSP by means of community oriented enhanced cooperation and
orienting the military dimension according to a model of regulated flexibility, however,
would lead to a re-evaluation of the constellations in international politics.
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